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STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction after a
jury trial in the Third Circuit Court for Salt Lake City,
the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans presiding, on the charges of
improper satellite dish placement under the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City.

Section 51-5-7 jurisdiction

for this appeal is provided in Section 78-2-3, Utah Code
Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Is Salt Lake City preempted by federal law from

regulating location of certain structures, including
satellite dish antennas, in front yards?
2.

Are any of Palmer's other 149 issues grounds for

reversal of the trial court?

GOVERNING LAW
Salt Lake City Ordinance:
Sec, 51-5-7. Front yard exceptions. The
area of a required front yard shall be open
and unobstructed except for the following
which are permitted:
(1) Fences, walls, or other similar
structures as provided elsewhere by this
chapter.
(2) Uncovered steps leading to the main
building; provided, however, that they are
not more than four feet in height and do not
cause any danger or hazard to traffic by
obstructing the view of the street or
intersection. Any portion of any steps,
covered or uncovered, that are more than four
feet above grade must be back of the required
setback line.
(3) Eaves or cornices projecting not more
than two feet.
(4) Driveway leading to a properly located
garage or parking area; provided, however, no
portion of a front yard as required in this
ordinance, except for those approved
driveways, shall be hard-surfaced or graveled
so as to encourage or make possible the
parking of automobiles, nor shall the city
allow any curb cuts or approve any driveways
except for entrance and exit driveways
leading to properly located parking areas.
(5) Circular driveways shall be permitted in
required front yard areas of single family
dwellings leading to and from a properly
located garage or carport on the property
subject to the following conditions:
(a) All such drives shall be of
concrete construction.
(b) Such drives shall not be over
twelve (12) feet in width.

(c) There shall be an area in
landscaping at least fifteen (15) feet
in depth from the front property line to
the farthest edge of the drive.
(d) Driveway areas are not to be used
for the parking or storage of any
trailer, boat or other equipment at any
time, nor is the area to be used for
overnight or permanent parking of any
vehicle.
(e) Passenger automobiles may be parked
on driveways serving private residences,
provided the automobile is parked
completed on private property.
Federal Communication Commission Regulation.

47 CFR

Ch. (1 10-1-88 edition) §25.104.
State and local zoning or other regulations
that differentiate between satellite receiveonly antennas and other types of antenna
facilities are preempted unless such
regulations:
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined
health, safety or aesthetic objective; and
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable
limitations on, or prevent, reception of
satellite delivered signals by receive-only
antennas or to impose costs on the users of
such antennas that are excessive in light of
the purchase and installation cost of the
equipment.
Regulation of satellite transmitting antennas
is preempted in the same manner except that
state and local health and safety regulation
is not preempted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/appellant Bruce Palmer (Palmer) was charged
by an Information with violating Section 51-5-7 Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City by unlawfully placing an

unlawful structure, a satellite dish antenna, in his front
yard.

The facts when viewed in a light most favorable to

upholding the jury verdict, are as follows:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant Bruce Palmer ("Palmer") is the owner of

the real property at 833 East Pennsylvania Avenue.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, (R. 50-51).
2.

Craig Spangenberg of the Salt Lake City Building

and Housing Division received a complaint concerning 833
East Pennsylvania Avenue (R. 37). At that location, he
observed a satellite dish antenna located in the front yard
(R. 3 8 ) . Spangenberg advised the defendant that the
satellite dish in the front yard was a violation of Salt
Lake City ordinance on December 16, 1987.
3.

(R. 4 3 ) .

On December 17, 1987, Spangenberg issued Palmer a

Notice and Order by certified mail (R. 43-44) notifying the
defendant that he was in violation of Salt Lake City
Ordinance No. 51-5-7 allowing only certain structures in the
front yard and ordering Palmer to remove a satellite dish
located in his front yard before January 4, 1988.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 ) .
4.

A misdemeanor citation for violation of Salt Lake

City Ordinance 51-5-7 was issued to Palmer on January 6,
1988 (CR 1-2).

5.

Palmer was advised of his right to apply for a

variance on December 31, 1988 (R. 45). Palmer did not apply
for a variance (R. 47). At trial on July 5, 1989, the jury
found the defendant had not complied with the notice and
order (R. 52) and was guilty of violating §51-5-7,
R.O.S.L.C.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Salt Lake City T s regulation of front yard

structures, including satellite receive only dish antennas,
is not preempted by federal law because Salt Lake f s
regulation does not differentiate between satellite receive
only antennas and other types of antennas and the Salt Lake
City ordinance has reasonable health, safety and aesthetic
objectives that do not impose unreasonable limitations on
satellite received signals.
2.

The balance of Palmer's 149 issues including the

trial court lacking jurisdiction because judges are not
compensated in gold or silver and defendant's fine not being
valid because tender was in currency rather than gold or
silver are without any substantial merit.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SALT LAKE CITY'S REGULATION OF FRONT
YARD STRUCTURES INCLUDING SATELLITE
RECEIVE ONLY ANTENNAS IS NOT PREEMPTED
BY FEDERAL LAW.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether Salt Lake
City Ordinance 51-5-7 regulating what structures are
permissible on front yards is preempted by Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) regulation.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a
federal law may preempt a state law where conflict exists
between the federal and state law.
Article VI, §2.

U.S. Constitution

Similarly federal regulations may preempt

state and local laws.
L.Ed.2d 580 (1984).

Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 81

A federal regulation preempts local law

if the federal agency has exercised complete authority in
the area in question and if the agency is legally authorized
to preempt local law.

New York v. FCC, 100 L.Ed.2d 45, 57-

59 (1988).
In this case the FCC has exercised its regulatory
authority over satellite receive only dish antennas.

The

federal regulations, however, specifically allow local
control under certain guidelines.

Federal Regulation 47 CFR

§25.104 states that all local laws inconsistent with its

requirements are preempted.
The FCC has adopted regulations dealing specifically
with federal preemption of local zoning for satellite
antennas, entitled, "Preemption of Local Zoning of Earth
Stations."

47 CFR §25.104.

This regulation establishes the

following standards for preempting local law.
State and local zoning or other regulations
that differentiate between satellite receiveonly antennas and other types of antenna
facilities are preempted unless such
regulations:
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined
health, safety or aesthetic objective; and
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable
limitations on, or prevent, reception of
satellite delivered signals by receive-only
antennas or to impose costs on the users of
such antennas that are excessive in light of
the purchase and installation cost of the
equipment.
Regulation of satellite transmitting antennas
is preempted in the same manner except that
state and local health and safety regulation
is not preempted.
It is unclear whether the FCC in promulgating the
preemption, has acted within the boundaries of its
authority. In Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696
F.Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988), defendants asserted that the FCC
had exceeded its authority in preempting local regulations
of satellite antenna. The court held that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider this issue because, "before
an FCC order is submitted to judicial review, the FCC must
have been given the opportunity to reconsider its position
Id. at 1029. However, for the purpose of this Brief, it is
assumed that the FCC has legal authority to preempt local
law. The fact that the FCC has not reconsidered its
position on preemption in this case, or others, may perhaps
defeat the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals to
consider this issue.

(Emphasis added.)
This regulation establishes an initial standard to
determine if federal preemption occurs, i.e. the local
zoning ordinance must differentiate between satellite
receive only antennas and other types of antennas before
federal preemption occurs.

If a local ordinance

differentiates between satellite receive only antenna and
other types of antenna facilities federal preemption is
still not automatic.

The federal regulation then provides a

two part balancing test.

If the local restriction:

(1) is

reasonably related to health, safety or aesthetic
objectives, and, (2) does not impose costly burdens and
limitations on satellite users; it is not preempted by
2
federal law.
The threshold question thus is whether the City
ordinance "differentiates" between "satellite receive-only
antenna" and "other types of antenna facilities."

Palmer

was convicted of violating Salt Lake City Ordinance §51-5-7
which states, in part, "[T]he area of a required front yard
shall be open and unobstructed except for the following
which are permitted:

Van Meter, supra, at 1029-1031; Breeling v. Churchill, 423
N.W.2d 469, 471 (Neb. 1988); L.I.M.A. Partners v. Northvale,
530 A.2d 839, 844 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1987); Minars v. Rose,
507 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (A.D.2d Dept. 1986); Ross v. Hatfield,
640 F.Supp. 708, 712 (D.Kan. 1988).

(1)

A fence or wall . . .

(2)

Uncovered steps . . .

(3)

Eaves or cornices . . .

(4)

A driveway leading to a properly placed

garage. . • .
(5)

Circular driveways . • ."

Section 51-5-7 does not differentiate between types of
antennas.

It does not allow any type of antenna, whether

satellite, UHF, VHF or radio antenna, to be placed in a
front yard.

This section simply lists five (5) permitted

structures which can be placed in front yards.

Since the

City ordinance prohibits all types of antenna from being
placed in front yards, it does not discriminate among the
various types of antenna.

Thus, the City's ordinance meets

the FCC's first requirement and preemption is unwarranted.
Even if the discrimination test was met, Salt Lake City
Ordinance 51-5-7 would still survive the two part balancing
test and there would be no federal preemption.

The purpose

of the ordinance is to diminish the unsightly visual impact
of antenna by prohibiting placement in a front yard.

The

ordinance alleviates the concern with the surrounding
property values which may be diminished by placing antenna
in a front yard.

Some safety concerns may also be achieved

by preventing antenna placement in front yards to avoid the

3
hazards of a fallen or windblown antenna.
The City ordinance must not prevent or impose
unreasonable limitations on satellite reception; nor impose
unreasonable costs. Here, the City ordinance does not
completely prohibit the use of satellite antenna or other
antenna facilities.

The ordinance simply prevents front

yard placement of all antennaes.

Alternative placement

sites are easily available and Salt Lake Code §51-5-6
specifically allows for rear yard placement.

Other

placement alternatives, such as side yard or roof top
placement may be sought. Furthermore, the City is not
3
Salt Lake City Code Section 51-1-2 provided:
21.02.020 Purpose of Title 21 provisions.
This title is designed and enacted for the purpose of
promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience,
order, prosperity and welfare of the present and future
inhabitants of Salt Lake City, including among other
things:
A. The lessening of congestion in the streets or
roads;
B.

Securing safety from fire and other dangers;

C.

Providing adequate light and air;

D. Classification of land uses and distribution of
land development and utilization;
E.

Protection of the tax base;

F.

Securing economy in governmental expenditures; and

G. Fostering the city's industrial, business and
residential development. (Prior code §51-1-2).

insensitive to the unique needs and circumstances of
individuals and properties.

Should no other placement

alternative be available, a satellite user may apply for a
variance to place his satellite in a front yard location.
The City ordinance neither imposes nor creates unreasonable
costs upon the satellite user.

Unlike other ordinances, the

City ordinance does not impose costly screenings or barriers
to be placed around a satellite antenna.
In Van Meter, supra, the town of Maplewood passed an
ordinance prohibiting the placement of satellite antenna in
front yards and on roof tops.

The ordinance required a 10

foot height limitation and the satellite dish to be enclosed
by a 6 foot wall of evergreen shrubbery to hide its
visibility from adjoining property and from the streets.
Plaintiff, after unsuccessfully applying for a variance,
placed his satellite antenna on his roof.

The Township of

Maplewood commenced action to enforce the township
ordinance.

The court held that although the town ordinance

had a legitimate health, safety and aesthetic object, it
discriminated against satellite antenna users.

The court

held that the ordinance singled out satellite antennas over
"other types of antenna facilities," and, in fact, excluded
from the ordinances' coverage UHF, VHF and radio antennas
similarly placed.

The court further concluded that the

screening requirements of evergreen shrubbery were too
costly a burden placed on the satellite user.

Unlike the Van Meter case Salt Lake City does not
differentiate between antennas.

It makes all types of

antennas subject to the same requirement, they are not
permitted structures in front yard areas and therefore
federal preemption would not apply.

Even if, arguendo,

differentiation could be found the Salt Lake City Ordinance
meets the requirements that there is a reasonable relation
to health, safety and aesthetic objectives and there is no
costly burden or limitation on satellite receive-only
antenna users.
POINT II.
PALMER'S REMAINING ISSUES PRESENTED ON
APPEAL DO NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT.
Palmer has asserted numerous issues on appeal, for
clarity, these issues can be grouped as follows:
Issues 3-11, 29, 30, 45-51, 55-62, 69, 70, 73-78, 8093, 95, 97-143, 146-148 generally discuss the legitimacy of
4
United States currency. These issues are meritless or were
not presented in the trial of this matter.

Issues not

raised or litigated at the trial level cannot be submitted
on appeal.

Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986).

Therefore, these issues should be dismissed.
4
These include such bizzare issues as: the trial court
lacking jurisdiction because judges are not compensated in
gold or silver; defendant's fine not being valid because
tender was in currency rather than gold or silver.

Issues 12-28, 31-35, 39, 40, 144 and 84, 150
collectively assert defendant's argument made at trial that
by placing a light on defendant's satellite dish, it became
a light pole.

Defendant also argued the satellite dish was

an ornamental feature.
These issues are factual issues presented to the jury
by the defendant and which the jury found against the
defendant. The standard of review from a jury trial is
5
narrow, an appellate court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the jury.

The evidence is reviewed in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict.7 So long as there
is some evidence including reasonable inferences from which
findings of all requisite elements of the crime can
Q

reasonably be made, the appellate inquiry stops.

In the

present case, there was no credible evidence presented to
prove defendant's claim that a satellite dish became a light
pole simply by placing a light on it or, that it was an
ornamental feature.

Rather, the evidence presented by the

City indicated that placing a light on the satellite dish
and calling it a light pole was pretextural (R. 84).
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
Id. at 447.

Defendant also argues that there was selective
enforcement of the City Codes and he was thereby subjected
to discrimination.

The City enforcement officer testified

that he had enforced other violations that the defendant had
brought to his attention in the same neighborhood, including
requiring one homeowner to remove a refrigerator from the
front of his house and requiring absentee property owners to
clean up a vacant lot (R. 81-82).

Therefore, there was no

selective enforcement as the defendant claimed.

These

issues must fail on their merits.
In Issues 8, 63-68 and 96, Palmer argues that his
satellite dish antenna is a nonconforming use or that Salt
Lake City Ordinance 51-5-7 was an ex post facto law.

To

qualify as nonconforming use, defendant must have used his
property in a nonconforming way prior to the date the
g
ordinance came into effect making it nonconforming.
In
this case, Salt Lake City Ordinance No. 51-5-7 regulating
structures in the front yard of a property was passed in
1983.

Defendant testified that he had placed the

21.04.335

Nonconforming use.

"Nonconforming use" means a use which lawfully occupied a
building or land at the time the ordinance codified in this
title became effective, and which does not conform with the
use regulations of the zone in which it is located. (Prior
code §51-2-39)
See full text attached as Appendix A.

satellite dish in his yard in 1985 (R. 111). Therefore,
there is no nonconforming use.
Likewise, for Salt Lake City Ordinance 51-5-7 to have
been an ex post facto law it must have been passed after the
defendant had placed his satellite antenna in the front
yard.

It was not.
Issues 71, 72, 79 and 149 raise the issue of

ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defendant alleges that

counsel failed to argue federal preemption and failed to
introduce photographs of other satellite dishes located in
Salt Lake City to prove defendant's selective enforcement
argument.

The record, however, indicates that both of these

points were argued to the court by counsel.

Counsel

introduced evidence of other satellite dishes (R. 61, 62)
and attempted to argue the issue of federal preemption to
the court (R. 90). The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the
standards that must be met to establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

The defendant must

first show that "specific identified acts or omissions fall
outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance" and second, that he was prejudiced as a result
of the alleged deficiencies, i.e., the defendant must

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986). These
standards have been adopted by this Court in State v.
Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987).

"affirmatively show that a reasonable probability exists
that but for counsel's error, the result would have been
different.
Defendant's alleged omissions did not occur and
therefore do not constitute the required showing.

These

issues should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Salt Lake City Ordinance §51-5-7 is not preempted by
FCC regulation.

It equally regulates all types of antennas.

The ordinance does not discriminate among antennas and does
not create unreasonable limitations on satellite users.
Therefore, federal preemption is unwarranted.

The remainder

of Palmer's issues are oblivious to the record and do not
merit consideration by this Court.

The jury verdict finding

the defendant guilty should be sustained by this Court.
DATED this

day of

, 1989.

RICHARD G. HAMP
Assistant City Prosecutor
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent to Bruce P. Palmer, pro se,
933 Pennsylvania Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, by
depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this
day of

, 1989.

APPENDIX A

Sec. 51-5-7. Front yard exceptions. The area of a
required front yard shall be open and unobstructed except
for the following which are permitted:
(1) Fences, walls, or other similar structures as
provided elsewhere by this chapter.
(2) Uncovered steps leading to the main building;
provided, however, that they are not more than four feet in
height and do not cause any danger or hazard to traffic by
obstructing the view of the street or intersection. Any
portion of any steps, covered or uncovered, that are more
than four feet above grade must be back of the required
setback line.
(3)

Eaves or cornices projecting not more than two

feet.
(4) A driveway leading to a properly located garage or
parking area; provided, however, no portion of a front yard
as required in this ordinance, except for these approved
driveways, shall be hard-surfaced or graveled so as to
encourage or make possible the parking of automobiles, nor
shall the city allow any curb cuts or approve any driveways
except for entrance and exit driveways leading to properly
located parking areas.
(5) Circular driveways shall be permitted in required
front yard areas of single family dwellings leading to and
from a properly located garage or carport on the property
subject to the following conditions:
(a)
construction.

All such drives shall be of concrete

(b) Such drives shall not be over twelve (12)
feet in width.
(c) There shall be an area in landscaping at
least fifteen (15) feet in depth from the front property
line to the farthest edge of the drive.
(d) Driveway areas are not to be used for the
parking or storage of any trailer, boat or other equipment
at any time, nor is the area to be used for overnight or
permanent parking of any vehicle.

(e) Passenger automobiles may be parked on
driveways serving private residences, provided the -,
automobile is parked completely on private property.

12

^^
This ^s the text of the ordinance from 1983 to May 1,
1988 when it was recodified/with minor changes to Section
21.80.090 Salt Lake City Ordinances.
'

